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What is Strategic Culture? 
Before delving directly into the history of the subject, it might be helpful to give a 
definition so that one knows what is meant by the term strategic culture (a thorough 
description and assessment of the current debate over the definition of strategic 
culture is provided below).  Scholars have failed to agree upon a definition of 
strategic culture.  Colin Gray‟s definition, however, suits our purposes and will be 
used here:  “[t]he persisting socially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits 
of mind, and preferred methods that are more or less specific to a particular geo-
graphically based security community that has had a unique historical experience.”1  
This work argues that strategic culture does exist, meaning that polities differ in 
their approach to strategy and war.  In order to understand further and explain the 
utility of strategic culture, this discussion addresses its history, sources, importance 
and the arguments of both its opponents and proponents. 
Strategic culture is a derivative of political culture.  Studies in political culture 
became fashionable during the 1960s with the publication of Gabriel Almond and 
Sidney Verba‟s The Civic Culture.2  One should think of political culture much like 
strategic culture, but in a broader sense.  Political culture refers to the group‟s view 
of the proper role of the governing authority, while strategic culture refers to the 
group‟s view of how the governing authority should approach its security issues.  
                                                 
1
 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 131. 
2
 For two prominent works on political culture see, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The 
Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1965); and John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International 
Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1999). 
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Dissected even further, “national style” or “way of war” derives from strategic 




The History of Strategic Culture 
Jack Snyder introduced the term “strategic culture” during the 1970s in a report 
that argued that the Soviet approach to nuclear strategy differed greatly from that 
of the Americans.
2
  Though Snyder is credited with coining the term, the concept 
of strategic culture has existed for over two millennia.  Sun Tzu and Thucydides 
both stressed in their classic works the importance of culture and its relationship 
with strategy.
3
  Using a similar approach to war and strategy Ken Booth, in 1979, 
reintroduced the concept of ethnocentrism, which suggests that “societies look at 
the world with their own group as the centre, they perceive and interpret other 
societies within their own frames of reference, and they invariably judge them 
inferior.”4  While Booth credits W. G. Sumner with introducing the term in 1906,5 
Richard E. Nisbett traces the word back to its origin in Ancient Greece.  He claims, 
“The term resulted from the Greeks‟ recognition that their belief that their way of 
life was superior to that of the Persians might be based on mere prejudice.  They 
decided it was not.”6  Many of the themes in today‟s writings on culture and 
strategy resemble those in the works of both Snyder and Booth. 
As should be obvious by now, the concepts of strategic culture and ethnocentrism 
are not novel.
7
  Throughout history one can find strategists who recognized the 
                                                 
1
 See, Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War: The British Army's Way in Warfare, 1945-95  
(London: Brassey's, 1996), p. 3;  Colin S. Gray, “British and American Strategic Cultures,” in 
Democracies in Partnership: 400 Years of Transatlantic Engagement, The ACT/ODU James-
town Symposium; 18-19 April, 2007, Norfolk, VA: HQ, Allied Command Transformation, 
2008, pp. 123-150; Lawrence Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War (London:  Rout-
ledge, 2006), p. 1. 
2
 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, 
R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, September 1977). 
3
 Jeffrey S. Lantis points this out in, “Strategic Culture:  From Clausewitz to Construc-
tivism,” Strategic Insights, Vol. 4, Issue 10, (October 2005).  Sun-tzu, The Art of War, 
Ralph D. Sawyer, trans., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994); Robert B. Strassler, ed., 
The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to “The Peloponnesian War,” Richard 
Crawley, trans., rev. edn., New York: Free Press, 1996. 
4
 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York : Holmes & Meier, 1979), p. 13.  
5
 Ibid., p. 15.  Booth cites W. G. Sumner, Folkway (Boston: Ginn, 1906), p. 13. 
6
 Richard E. Nisbett, The Geography of Thought:  How Asians and Westerners Think Diffe-
rently... and Why (New York, NY:  Free Press, 2003), p. 4. 
7
 To support his argument that the decline of geopolitical studies is more a result of aca-
demic trends than a natural adjustment to a major shift in international politics, Jakub Gry-
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differences in approaches to war and used such knowledge to their advantage.  For 
example, Colin Gray points out that “[a]round 600 A.D., Byzantine Emperor 
Maurice devoted Book XI of his Strategikon to the „characteristics and tactics of 
various peoples‟; his purpose, he said, was „to enable those who intend to wage war 
against these peoples [Persians, Scythians, Franks, Slavs] to prepare themselves 
properly.  For all nations do not fight in a single formation or in the same way.‟”1  
During the nineteenth century Carl von Clausewitz described war as having a 
subjective nature that is constantly evolving, and partially is shaped by the cultures 
of the belligerents.
2
  The general theories of war and strategy provided by Sun Tzu, 
Thucydides, and Clausewitz, serve as helpful guides for scholars interested in 
strategic culture and national ways of war. 
The twentieth century witnessed numerous works on national ways of war, many 
of which were written by historians and drew little attention from political 
scientists.
3
  In 1932, Basil H. Liddell Hart wrote The British Way in Warfare and 
described Britain‟s traditional approach to warfare as an “indirect approach” that 
avoids direct assaults against the enemy‟s main force.  He argued that the heavy 
British losses in the trenches on the Western Front during the First World War 
could have been avoided had it held to its traditional indirect approach.
4
  After the 
                                                                                                                            
giel points out that the history of academia is a history of the rise and decline of fashionable 
ideas.  The same could be said of strategic culture.  Grygiel quotes Tocqueville, who recog-
nized this characteristic of institutions of higher learning when he said, “It is unbelievable 
how many systems of moral and politics have been successively found, forgotten, redisco-
vered, forgotten again, to reappear a little later, always charming and surprising the world 
as if they were new, and bearing witness, not to the fecundity of the human spirit, but to the 
ignorance of men.” Jakub J. Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 180, fn 1, Originally quoted in David Yost, 
“Political Philosophy and the Theory of International Relations,” International Affairs, Vol. 
70,  (April 1994), p. 265. 
1
 Colin S. Gray, The Geopolitics of Super Power (Lexington, KY:  The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1988) p. 136.  Gray cites, George T. Dennis, trans., Maurice’s Strategikon:  
Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1984), p.  113. 
2
 Clausewitz, Carl von, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 585-594.  See also Stephen Peter 
Rosen, “Military Effectiveness:  Why Society Matters,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 
4 (Spring, 1995) p. 27; and Lantis, “Strategic Culture.” 
3
 Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War, p. 1. 
4
 Basil H. Liddell Hart: The British Way in Warfare (London: Faber & Faber, 1932); idem, 
The Strategy of the Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 1941); For a differing 
perspective see Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment:  The Dilemma of British 
Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1972).  
For a challenge to the notion that Britain has a distinct way of warfare see David French, 
The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990). 
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Second World War Ruth Benedict—a student of Franz Boas, “father of American 
anthropology”—studied Japanese culture in an effort to understand the aggression 
that produced such acts as the kamikaze attacks on the U.S. Navy.
1
 
The latter half of the twentieth century saw three waves of works on national way 
of war hit strategic studies in the 1970s.  First, in 1973, Russell Weigley presented 
his American Way of War, and set the standard for subsequent works on the 
subject. Weigley argued that the traditional American way of war is best 
characterized by its historical reliance on a strategy of annihilation.
2
  In the same 
year, Bernard Brodie‟s War and Politics provided us with a quote often cited by 
culturalists: “good strategy presumes good anthropology and sociology.  Some of 
the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from juvenile evaluations in 
this department.”3  A year later, Frank A. Kierman Jr. and John K. Fairbank edited 
a volume entitled Chinese Ways in Warfare.
4
  A second wave came in the 1980s 
included works such as Edward S. Boylan “The Chinese Cultural Style of 
Warfare,”5 along with Colin S. Gray‟s Nuclear Strategy and National Style,6 and 
Victor David Hanson‟s transnational work, The Western Way of War.7  The latest 
and perhaps most widespread wave of works on strategic culture followed Alastair 
Iain Johnston‟s Cultural Realism.8  Many of these waves brought different 
approaches to the study of war and culture and each author presented his or her 
own unique concept of strategic culture and its relevance to war and strategy. 
 
Sources of Strategic Culture 
The concept of strategic culture adopted here draws heavily from anthropology, 
social ecology and geopolitics.  This work argues that differences in strategic styles 
are grounded in geography and shaped by history.  In order to understand a 
                                                 
1
 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946). 
2
 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 
Strategy and Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. xiv. 
3
 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973). 
4
 Frank A. Kierman Jr., and John K. Fairbank, Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, 
Mass: 1974). 
5
 Edward S. Boylan, “The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 
3, No. 4, (1982), pp. 341-364. 
6
 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (London: Hamilton Press, 1986). 
7
 Victor David Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New 
York: Knopf, 1989). 
8
Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese 
History, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995).  For a list of works that 
followed Johnston, see Sondhaus, Strategic Culture and Ways of War, p. 2. 
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particular strategic culture one needs to study in combination the geographic 
context, the historical context, and the political context of the polity under 
examination.  Although geography and history work interdependently to shape 
strategic culture, for the sake of clarity it is best to discuss each separately and then 
in conjunction. 
 
Geography and Strategic Culture 
Geography provides the best starting point for examining the origins of different 
strategic cultures.
1
  People across the globe over time developed different ways of 
organizing themselves to adapt to their local environment.  Because groups of 
people settled into territories with different geographical characteristics they 
adopted different ways of utilizing their territory to ensure survival and prosperity, 
which led to the development of distinct habits and attitudes about life.  While 
some habits and especially attitudes within a polity will be ephemeral, responding 
to sudden and mild changes that effect the social environment, the habits and 
attitudes that are passed on from generation to generation with little change deserve 
the label “cultural.”  This is not to say that culture does not change, it changes 
constantly albeit usually very slowly.  Causes for these changes may be consequen-
ces of geographic or climate changes, but are usually the result of interactions with 
neighboring nations (change in culture will be discussed at certain points 
throughout this work).  After multiple interactions with neighbors, societies deve-
lop habits and attitudes about these interactions and interrelations, which even-
tually become cultural. 
Geography as a source of strategic culture is not a novel idea.  Hippocrates, “The 
Father of Medicine,” suggested that the differences of character amongst people are 
explicable by their climate and geography.
2
  He is worth quoting at length: 
                                                 
1
 For a recent study that argues that geography is underappreciated by contemporary social 
scientists see Harm J.De Blij, Why Geography Matters: Three Challenges Facing America:  
Climate Change, the Rise of China, and Global Terrorism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005).  Oliver M. Lee points out that, “several scholars who have written about 
strategic culture in recent years were more specific in that they cited geography as a major 
source of a nation‟s strategic culture, but unfortunately most have stopped short of exp-
laining why and how strategic culture is linked to geography.  Lee, Oliver M., “The Geo-
politics of America‟s Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 27, No. 3, (May/Jun 
2008), p. 272. 
2
 Adda B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History (Princeton, New Jersey:  
Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 75. 
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And with regard to the pusillanimity and cowardice of the inhabitants, the principal 
reason the Asiatics are more unwarlike and of gentler disposition than the 
Europeans is, the nature of the seasons, which do not undergo any great changes 
either to heat or cold, or the like; for there is neither excitement of the under-
standing nor any strong change of the body whereby the temper might be ruffled 
and they be roused to inconsiderate emotion and passion, rather than living as they 
do always in the state... And you will find the Asiatics differing from one another, 
for some are better and others more dastardly; of these differences, as I stated 
before, the changes of the seasons are the cause. Thus it is with Asia.
1
 
While his description of Asiatic peoples is dubious, and his insistence that 
geography and climate directly determine the nature of a society‟s temperament is 
arguable, Hippocrates‟ observation is noteworthy for its choice of sources of 
differing temperaments amongst polities.  Herodotus, Hippocrates‟ contemporary, 
made similar observations,
2
 which have been expounded upon throughout history 
by scholars such as Bernhardus Varenius (1622-1650), Montesquieu (1689-1755), 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), and Fredrich Ratzel (1844-1904), to name a few. 
The same unique ideas and beliefs that guided groups of people to develop distinct 
ways of organizing their labor to maximize their prosperity carried over into their 
efforts to secure the fruits of their labor from the threats posed by hostile neighbors 
who might not want to pay such a high price for provisions.  Geography has a 
profound effect on the scale of a nation‟s interaction with other nations.  Societies 
surrounded by rugged terrain or separated by great distances from other nations 
tend to have less interaction with foreign peoples than nations whose geography 
provides an easily accessible route (maritime or land) favorable for international 
commerce.  For example, both the ancient Egyptians and the Chinese developed a 
strong sense of “us and them.”  Adda Bozeman suggests this attitude is a reflection 
of their geographies.  Egypt was separated from the rest of Mesopotamia by the 
desert and the sea and had little contact with foreigners until the second millennium 
B.C.  Similarly, China owes its isolation to the deserts and mountains in the north 
and west and the ocean to the east. Also, the great rivers of these ancient 
civilizations provided ample food, causing little need to trade and interact with 
foreigners.  These geographic conditions heavily influenced their cultures and their 
self identity; both were highly ethnocentric and believed that they were respect-
                                                 
1
 Hippocrates, On Airs, Waters and Places, part 16, (see also part 24), available online at 
http://classics.mit.edu/Hippocrates/airwatpl.mb.txt - Translated by Francis Adams. 
2
 From Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, p. 75, fn 35, Bozeman cites 
Sarton, George, A History of Science, 2 Vols. Cambridge, 1952-1959. p. 369; and Baker, 
Ernest,  Greek Political Theory, London, 1918, pp. 69ff. 
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Geography also serves as the cornerstone for defense orientation.  In particular, the 
continental/maritime dichotomy provides a useful framework for further 
understanding of the subject.  Carnes Lord explains that, “[t]he clearest contrast is 
that between island and continental powers, a contrast which affects not only a 
nation's force size and structure but also its fundamental strategic orientation.”  
Concerning island powers he suggests, “the requirements of national defense have 
an intermittent rather than a continuous character, reliance tends to be placed on 
naval and militia forces rather than standing armies, and. . .commercial attitudes 
tend to shape national objectives and approaches to war.”2  History is replete with 
examples to support this claim. 
One of the more obvious cases is the island of Rhodes during the Hellenistic era.  
Rhodes was a maritime hub for commerce and used its navy to police the 
Mediterranean under the aegis of the Rhodian Sea Law.  As a commercial power 
which hosted foreign merchants, its citizens were exposed to many other cultures.  
Also, the Rhodians were able to prosper from the commercial interactions and were 
not forced to rely on their own agriculture for food.  Such an environment gave the 
Rhodians a greater degree of freedom to prosper and produce an almost natural 
governing order, mitigating the need for economic coordination under a highly 
centralized authoritative government.  According to Bozeman, “The Rhodians 
became famous as traders, navigators, astronomers, jurists, and diplomats; they 
were respected as courageous defenders of national independence and human 
rights.  But above all, they were known to stand for the freedom of the seas.”3 
The geographic explanation has much to offer strategists attempting to make sense 
of strategic history.  Many of the great wars in history were fought between 
maritime and continental powers: Athens versus Sparta, Carthage versus Rome, 
Britain versus France/Germany, and the United States versus the Soviet Union.
4
  
Continental  and maritime powers each have certain advantages and disadvantages 
in war.  In general, continental powers typically are able to utilize their interior 
lines to deliver mass at a precise point, while naval powers can use their mobility to 
launch coastal attacks at multiple points, thus stretching the forces of the opponent.  
                                                 
1
 Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, pp. 20, 26, 34. 
2
 Carnes Lord, “American Strategic Culture,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 5,  (1985), pp. 
272-273. 
3
 Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, p. 108. 
4
 See Colin S. Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power:  The Strategic Advantage of Navies in 
War (Toronto: Free Press, 1992), passim. 
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Also, continental powers usually fight on land where the defense tends to provide 
an advantage, whereas, maritime powers tend to wage naval warfare, in which the 
offense tends to have the advantage.  Nevertheless, they tend to pay a higher price 
for retreat than do their sea power opponents and are less inclined to use limited 
force against major threats to their survival.
1
 
Historically this continental-maritime interaction has prevented the rise of a 
hegemon on the Eurasian continent.
2
  This trend in strategic history is so strong 
that it serves as the basis for much geopolitical theory.  Sir Halford Mackinder 
posited that if a continental power was ever able to obtain unimpeded access to the 
resources of the Eurasian interior—what he called “the heartland”—that it would 
be able to dominate the coastal areas, thus preventing any chance of an invasion by 
a maritime power whose purpose would be to restore the balance of power on the 
continent.  Eventually, the continental hegemon would also become a naval power 
by utilizing its tremendous resources to build a navy capable of defeating that of 
any of the maritime powers.  He famously stated: 
Who rules East Europe controls the heartland: 
Who rules the heartland commands the World-Island: 
Who rules the World-Island commands the world.
3
 
Mackinder believed that it was the proper role of the maritime powers to check any 
potential Eurasian hegemon.  Maritime powers are not as likely to achieve world 
domination because of the difficultly they would have in conquering the heartland, 
where the defense tends to maintain the advantage. 
Nevertheless, most of the successful great military powers have developed armed 
forces consisting of a combination of both land and naval elements.  The reason for 
this is that a sea power with a strong naval capability and with a formidable land 
presence would generally be in a position to acquire more influence over both its 
                                                 
1
 Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style, p. 73. 
2
 Christopher Layne explains that because continental powers lack strong geographic 
barriers that impede invasions they are inclined to seek security through attempts at 
hegemony by eliminating and then preventing the rise of potential rivals (see below).  He 
argues that offshore/insular powers are more likely to adopt strategies that aim at the 
maintenance of a balance of power on the continent by preventing the rise of a hegemon, 
instead of seeking hegemony for themselves.  Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: 
American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2006), pp. 20-21; and idem, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing,” in Michael E. 
Brown, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, America’s Strategic 
Choices, International Security Readers, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997), p. 274. 
3
 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality:  A Study in the Politics of 
Reconstruction [1919] (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 1944), p. 86. 
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continental and maritime foes.  Of course, this very much depends on how well its 
forces can operate jointly; the navy would need to be able to secure its strategic 




This also holds true for a continental power, but in a slightly different manner.  
Naturally, continental powers are better situated to exploit the defensive.  Their 
problem tends to be their inability to move armies to meet the land forces of the 
more mobile maritime powers.
2
  Thus, historically it takes less military effort for 
maritime powers to contain the expansion of the continental powers than it does for 
the continental powers to deny the maritime powers an entry point to the continent.  
If a continental power acquires access to a coastal port and is able to defend it 
successfully, it still faces a risk of a naval blockade preventing it from challenging 
naval powers on the open seas.
3
  Nonetheless, this does not mean that continental 
powers cannot exploit the maritime geographic dimension for strategic advantage.  
Because their strategic objectives tend to focus on defending or expanding their 
political influence on the continent, land powers do not need a navy capable of 
breaking through a blockade or acquiring command of the sea for the purpose of an 
amphibious invasion. With few exceptions—Hitler‟s “Operation Sealion” being 
one—land powers typically do not attempt to conquer island powers, and when 
they do so they risk possible invasion by neighboring states, particularly those 
allied with the island power.  Continental powers do not need to command the sea 
                                                 
1
 The forces on land do not necessarily have to be a standing army or marine expeditionary 
force made up of one‟s own troops.  Typically, for reasons of strategic culture, the land 
forces tend to be those of a continental ally or coalition.  
2
 Mackinder feared that the land powers would capitalize on innovations in railway 
technology to offset the advantage that the sea powers have held for four hundred years.  
He suggested that “trans-continental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land-
power, and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heartland of Euro-Asia, in 
vast areas of which neither timber nor accessible stone was available for road-making.  
Railways work the greater wonders in the steppe because they directly replace horse and 
camel mobility, the road stage of development having here been omitted.” Halford J. 
Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No. 4, 
(April 1904), p.434. 
3
 Mackinder was not alone in theorizing about such a possibility.  During the Second World 
War, Nicholas J. Spykman warned about the negative geopolitical consequences for the 
West if the Soviet Union were given too much of the spoils of war.  He suggested that the 
West secure the periphery (or what he called “the rimland”) of Eurasia in order to prevent 
the geopolitical expansion of the Soviet Union.  This was the basis of the containment 
strategy used by the United States during the Cold War.  See Nicholas John Spykman, The 
Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944).  See also Mackubin Thomas 
Owens, “In Defense of Classical Geopolitics,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 52, no. 4, 
(Autumn 1999) pp. 59-76. 
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to acquire a strategic advantage; they only need to deny the maritime power 
unimpeded access from the home country to the continent.  A guerre de course 
strategy could be used to disrupt the SLOCs, making it difficult for the maritime 
power to bring manpower and supplies to the continent.  This would cause the 
latter to divert its resources from maintaining and furthering its continental 
influence to focus on a buildup of naval forces to meet the challenge on the seas.
1
 
To endorse the ideas of Mackinder and other geopolitical theorists who emphasize 
the role of the continental/maritime dichotomy throughout history does not 
necessarily make one a geographical determinist who rejects the important role of 
culture in strategy and war.
2
  It is geopolitics, nevertheless, that sets the stage for 
international relations.
3
  Geopolitical realities also help shape the form into which 
culture develops.  This phenomenon is most obvious in the way in which states 
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 For more on this see Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 
1660-1783 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1890).  For more on the continental/maritime dichotomy 
see Colin S. Gray, War, Peace, and Victory:  Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), pp. 43-78. 
2
 Some realists, including classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau, exaggerate the 
geographic focus of geopolitics to the point of accusations of determinism.  See C. Dale 
Walton, Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-first Century:  Multipolarity and 
the Revolution in Strategic Perspective (London: Routledge, 2007), p. 18-23.  Walton 
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geopolitics.  For a somewhat different interpretation see Grygiel, Great Powers and 
Geopolitical Change, pp. 5-11. Grygiel credits Morgenthau (and others, particularly 
Nicholas Spykman) for rescuing geopolitics from Mackinder‟s geographically deterministic 
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sciences‟ grip on the subject, allowing it to be used by social scientists as well.  However, 
reviewing Mackinder‟s work, particularly his Democratic Ideals and Reality, it is difficult 
to ignore the prescriptive theme which draws heavily from the history of man‟s attempts to 
utilize the natural geography of the territory that he inhabits for his own advantage.  The 
purpose of much of Mackinder‟s work was to persuade the British Government that it 
should pay close attention to the balance of power on the continent because the 
technological innovations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were likely to 
result in a greater advantage for the great land powers—a shift from the previous four 
hundred years in which the sea powers maintained the advantage.  It should also be pointed 
out that Mackinder argued that the “geographic pivot of history” is not static.  One can only 
assume that geography itself could not cause the pivot to move, and therefore, it is the 
actions of human beings that create conditions which would allow for such movement.  
Raymond Aron maintains a similar view see, Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 197-98. 
3
 Grygiel explains that states do not always following the geopolitical path of least 
resistance, as “the knowledge of geopolitics indicates only the likely direction of a state‟s 
foreign policy.”  See Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, p. xii.  Emphasis in 
the original.  
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portion the disposition of their military forces.  While treading dangerously near 
the banal it might be appropriate to state the obvious: continental powers tend to 
favor the army in defense allocation whereas island powers tend to favor the navy.  
While this fact in and of itself is more a response to geopolitical realities than to a 
cultural proclivity, culture influences how these states view the role of such forces.  
Geography alone cannot explain why certain maritime powers (or continental 
powers) devote large amounts of resources to the army (or the navy) at the expense 
of the navy (or the army).  Yet, history is punctuated with examples, such as the 
British Expeditionary Force during the First World War and the German High Seas 
Fleet during the same war to name but two.
1
  Why is this so?  Because the 
complexity of the human element that determines strategic objectives and oversees 
the organization of the military confounds simple mono-causal geopolitical 
explanations.  One must therefore turn to history to make sense of geopolitics and 
its relationship with strategy.  It is important to remember that while strategic 
culture is grounded in geopolitical reality, it is shaped by history. 
 
History and Strategic Culture 
Before beginning this discussion on how culture is shaped, it might be helpful to 
elaborate on the meaning of “culture.”  Raymond Williams describes culture as “a 
description of a particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values 
not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behaviour.”2  Colin 
Gray suggests, “[c]ulture is about our identity and our loyalties.  It is what we have 
learned about ourselves, our society and state, and the world, and it is about how 
we have learned to approach those vital maters.”3  An empiricist approach, such as 
Gray‟s, has much to offer scholars interested in the relationship between culture 
and history.  In reference to culture, people are their history, or to be more precise, 
people are what they perceive their history to be.  Culture allows for identity, 
particularly in the context of being part of a community.  It rewards those who 
think and behave within culturally established parameters, and punishes or shuns 
those that do not. 
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As we have already established, geography provides the foundation for culture and 
social ecology provides explanations for its origin, but it is history that gives it its 
shape.  When peoples from different cultures interact, they become familiar with 
certain beliefs and mindsets that did not mirror their own.  After a number of 
interactions, beliefs and mindsets may be adjusted in order to maximize the 
probability that one‟s purpose for the interaction would be fulfilled.  Over time 
patterns begin to form and with them the development of ideas concerning the 
likely success of certain approaches in dealings with neighbors.
1
  After these ideas 
are put into practice time and time again they became habitual and eventually 
cultural. 
Such interactions surely produce a large degree of imitation, but what the different 
polities learn from one another would have been at least somewhat distorted by 
original ideas the polity held before the interactions took place.  Also, the lessons 
learned from cultural exchanges, would be reshaped after being put into practice in 
one‟s home territory.  One would, for example, expect that the nomads from the 
desert and the steppes, would view the purposes for the highly centralized 
authoritarian manner in which the hydraulic society of ancient China developed, 




History, Geography and Strategic Culture 
G. P. Gooch reminds us that “geography is the mother of history.”3  Political 
geography, like physical geography, also sets the stage for cultural development 
and evolution.  As mentioned earlier, island powers tend to be maritime-oriented, 
giving preference to the navy and relying on trade for material prosperity.  Coastal 
polities will often share many cultural characteristics with both island and 
continental powers, because too great a preference for the army or the navy could 
open the door for an opponent to exert influence over the state.  Nonetheless, not 
all continental powers are created equal.  Insular continental powers such as 
China—which is surrounded by oceans on its eastern flank, mountains on the west, 
and a desert on the north—will not experience a continual major threat to its 
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survival by one of its neighbors.
1
 The only natural barriers that non-insular 
continental powers such as Russia have for protection is sheer distance from hostile 
neighbors. Thus, they rarely have a respite from major security threats.
2
 
Again, these geographic realities do not determine culture per se, but they set the 
stage, allowing history to shape culture.  Actually, it is history, not geography, that 
provides empirical evidence for the relevance of geopolitical theory.  Through a 
large portion of its history, Russia has faced major external threats to its security.
3
  
Next door, however, the Chinese have rarely faced a major external threat to their 
way of life.
4
  These influences tend to have a major effect on a polity‟s style of war 
and strategy.  For example, Bozeman explains that throughout most of its history 
the Byzantine empire was geographically surrounded by multiple states powerful 
enough to pose a serious threat to its survival.  She suggests that Byzantium 
adopted a strategic style that allowed for great flexibility and provided feasible 
options short of war not because it disdained organized violence, but because it 
wanted to avoid a multi-front assault on its homeland.
5
 
While some polities might have similar geographies, the fluidity of the human 
element that permeates history ensures that each polity will have a unique way of 
viewing the world and its rightful place in that world.  Each and every security 
community‟s strategic culture will be sui generis because no two polities have 
identical histories. Also, some are more demographically and economically blessed 
than others.  Although this is mostly caused by geography, it is also a function of 
how territorial resources are managed.  Some states historically have had powerful 
neighbors while others have not.  At times relations with neighbors will be better 
than others.  The geographic, historic, and political contexts help explain a polity‟s 
culture and how it slowly changes. 
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Strategic culture is a concept that characterizes the way a security community thinks about 
the use of force or the threat of the use of force.  It is constantly evolving, but only changes 
slowly as it is tethered to geography and history.  Strategic culture allows the realists to 
hone his or her skills even more precisely than material variables allow for as beliefs and 
habits of mind are important variables in decision making at the top levels, but are difficult 
to quantify.  For practitioners of strategy the concept of strategic culture is a helpful tool in 
understanding what kinds of forces an opponent will deploy and how they will be used in 
war.  Before, however, we can use strategic culture to help us prepare strategies we must 
first develop a deep understanding of where it comes from then we should be able to 
understand better our opponents and eventually perhaps even ourselves. 
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